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ABSTRACT
A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software
Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a
data owner the integrity of the initial state of an enclave, including
the program to operate on her data. For this purpose, the data-
processing program is supposed to be open to the owner or a trusted
third party, so its functionality can be evaluated before trust can
be established. In the real world, however, increasingly there are
application scenarios in which the program itself needs to be pro-
tected (e.g., proprietary algorithm). So its compliance with privacy
policies as expected by the data owner should be verified without
exposing its code.
To this end, this paper presents CAT, a new model for TEE-based
confidential attestation. Our model is inspired by Proof-Carrying
Code (PCC), where a code generator produces proof together with
the code and a code consumer verifies the proof against the code on
its compliance with security policies. Given that the conventional
solutions do not work well under the resource-limited and TCB-
frugal TEE, we come up with a new design that allows an untrusted
out-enclave generator to analyze and instrument the source code of
a program when compiling it into binary and a trusted in-enclave
consumer efficiently verifies the correctness of the instrumentation
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and the presence of other protection before running the binary.
Our design strategically moves most of the workload to the code
generator, which is responsible for producing well-formatted and
easy-to-check code, while keeping the consumer simple. Also, the
whole consumer can be made public and verified through a conven-
tional attestation. We implemented this model on Intel SGX and
demonstrate that it introduces a very small part of TCB (2000 LoCs),
compared with the sandbox solution or theorem-proving based
PCC. We also thoroughly evaluated its performance on micro- and
macro- benchmarks and real-world applications, showing that the
new design only incurs a small overhead (no more than 23%) when
enforcing several categories of security policies.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of hardware trusted
execution environments (TEEs) that enable efficient computation
on untrusted platforms. A prominent example is Intel SGX [44], a
TEE widely deployed on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) desktops
and server processors, providing secure memory called enclave to
host confidential computing on sensitive data, which are protected
from the adversary in control of the operating system and even with
physical access to the data-processing machine. Such a computing
model has already been supported by major cloud providers today,
including Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud [12, 54], and its fur-
ther adoption has been facilitated by the Confidential Computing
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
10
51
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
0 J
ul 
20
20
, , Weijie Liu, Wenhao Wang, XiaoFeng Wang, Xiaozhu Meng, Yaosong Lu, Hongbo Chen, Xinyu Wang, Qintao Shen, Kai Chen, Haixu Tang, Yi Chen, and Luyi Xing
Consortium [11], a Linux Foundation project that brings together
the biggest technical companies such as Intel, Google, Microsoft
and IBM etc. However, before TEEs can see truly wide deployment
for real-world confidential computing, key technical barriers still
need to be overcome, remote attestation in particular.
Remote attestation. At the center of a TEE’s trust model is remote
attestation (RA), which allows the user of confidential computing
to verify that the enclave code processing her sensitive data is
correctly built and operates on a genuine TEE platform, so her
data is well protected. This is done on SGX through establishing
a chain of trust rooted at a platform attestation key owned by the
hardware manufacturer and using the key to generate a Quote –
a signed report that contains the measurement of the code and
data in an enclave; the Quote is delivered to the data owner and
checked against the signature and the expected measurement hash.
This trust building process is contingent upon the availability of
the measurement, which is calculated from the enclave program
either by the data owner when the program is publicly available
or by a trusted third party working on the owner’s behalf. This
becomes problematic when the program itself is private and cannot
be exposed. Programs may have exploitable bugs or they may write
information out of the enclave through corrupted pointers easily.
For example, different banks and financial agencies would like
to jointly calculate a person’s credit score based on each other’s
data, without disclosing their individual data and the proprietary
algorithm processing it. As another example, the pharmaceutical
companies want to search for suitable candidates for their drug
trial without directly getting access to plaintext patient records
or exposing their algorithm (carrying sensitive genetic markers
discovered with million dollar investments) to the hospital. With
applications of this kind on the rise, new techniques for protecting
both data and code privacy are in great demand.
Confidential attestation: challenges. To address this problem,
we present in this paper a novel Confidential ATtestation (CAT )
model to enable verification of an enclave program’s compliance
with user-defined security policies without exposing its source or
binary code to unauthorized parties involved. Under the CATmodel,
a bootstrap enclave whose code is public and verifiable through the
Intel’s remote attestation, is responsible for performing the compli-
ance check on behalf of the participating parties, who even without
access to the code or data to be attested, can be convinced that
desired policies are faithfully enforced. However, building a system
to support the CAT model turns out to be nontrivial, due to the
complexity in static analysis of enclave binary for policy compli-
ance, the need to keep the verification mechanism, which is inside
the enclave’s trusted computing base (TCB), small, the demand for a
quick turnaround from the enclave user, and the limited computing
resources today’s SGX provides (about 96 MB physical memory
on most commercial hardware [23]). Simply sand-boxing the en-
clave code significantly increases the size of TCB, rendering it less
trustworthy, and also brings in performance overheads incurred by
confinement and checkpoint/rollback [35].
A promising direction we envision that could lead to a practi-
cal solution is proof-carry code (PCC), a technique that enables a
verification condition generator (VCGen) [26, 41, 51] to analyze a
program and create a proof that attests the program’s adherence to
policies, and a proof checker to verify the proof and the code. The
hope is to push the heavy-lifting part of the program analysis to the
VCGen outside the enclave while keeping the proof checker inside
the enclave small and efficient. The problem is that this cannot be
achieved by existing approaches, which utilize formal verification
(such as [46, 51]) to produce a proof that could be 1000× larger than
the original code. Actually, with years of development, today’s for-
mal verification techniques, theorem proving in particular, are still
less scalable, unable to handle large code blocks (e.g., over 10000
instructions) when constructing a security proof.
Our solution. In our research, we developed a new technique
to instantiate the CAT model on SGX. Our approach, called CAT-
SGX, is a PCC-inspired solution, which relies on out-of-enclave
targeted instrumentation for lightweight in-enclave information-
flow confinement and integrity protection, instead of heavyweight
theorem proving. More specifically, CAT-SGX operates an untrusted
code producer as a compiler to build the binary code for a data-
processing program (called target program) and instrument it with
a set of security annotations for enforcing desired policies at runtime,
together with a lightweight trusted code consumer running in the
bootstrap enclave to statically verify whether the target code indeed
carries properly implanted security annotations.
To reduce the TCB and in-enclave computation, CAT-SGX is
designed to simplify the verification step by pushing out most com-
puting burden to the code producer running outside the enclave.
More specifically, the target binary is expected to be well formatted
by the producer, with all its indirect control flows resolved, all possi-
ble jump target addresses specified on a list and enforced by security
annotations. In this way, the code consumer can check the target
binary’s policy compliance through lightweight Recursive Descent
Disassembly to inspect its complete control flow (Section 5.2), so
as to ensure the presence of correctly constructed security annota-
tions in front of each critical operation, such as read, store, enclave
operations like OCall, and stack management (through a shadow
stack). Any failure in such an inspection causes the rejection of
the program. Also, since most code instrumentation (for injecting
security annotations) is tasked to the producer, the code consumer
does not need to make any change to the binary except relocating
it inside the enclave. As a result, we only need a vastly simplified
disassembler, instead of a full-fledged, complicated binary analysis
toolkit, to support categories of security policies, including data leak
control, control-transfer management, self-modifying code block
and side/covert channel mitigation (Section 4.2). A wider spectrum
of policies can also be upheld by an extension of CAT-SGX, as
discussed in the paper (Section 7).
We implemented CAT-SGX in our research, building the code
producer on top of the LLVM compiler infrastructure and the code
consumer based upon the Capstone disassembly framework [2]
and the core disassembling engine for X86 architecture. Using this
unbalanced design, our in-enclave program has only 2000 lines
of source code, and together with all the libraries involved, it is
compiled into 1.9 MB binary. This is significantly smaller than
the NaCl’s core library used by Ryoan, whose binary is around 19
MB and the theorem prover Z3, with 26 MB. We further evaluated
our implementation on micro-benchmarks (nBench), as well as
macro-benchmarks, including credit scoring, HTTPS server, and
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also basic biomedical analysis algorithms (sequence alignment, se-
quence generation, etc.) over various sizes of genomic data (1000
Genomes Project [1]), under the scenario of confidential computing
as a service (Section 3.2). CAT-SGX incurs on average (calculated by
geometric mean) 20% performance overhead and less than 30% stor-
age overhead enforcing all the proposed security policies, and leads
to around 10% performance overhead and less than 20% storage
overhead without side/covert channel mitigation. We have released
our code on Github [3].
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are outlined as
follows:
• Confidential attestation model. We propose CAT, a new model
that extends today’s TEE to maintain the data owner’s trust in
protection of her enclave data, without exposing the code of the
data-processing program. This is achieved through enforcing a set
of security policies through a publicly verifiable bootstrap enclave.
This new attestation model enables a wide spectrum of applications
with great real-world demand in the confidential computing era.
• New techniques for supporting CAT on SGX. We present the design
for instantiating CAT on SGX, following the idea of PCC. Our
approach utilizes out-of-enclave code analysis and instrumentation
to minimize the workload for in-enclave policy compliance check,
which just involves a quick run of a well-formatted target binary
for inspecting correct instrumentation. This simple design offers
supports for critical policies, ranging from memory leak prevention
to side channel mitigation, through a much smaller TCB compared
with sand-box solutions.
• Implementation and evaluation. We implemented our design of
CAT-SGX and extensively evaluated our prototype on micro- and
macro- benchmarks, together with popular biomedical algorithms
on human genomic data. Our experiments show that CAT-SGX
effectively enforces various security policies at small cost, with
the delay incurred by memory leak prevention around 20% and
side-channel mitigation usually no more than 35%.
2 BACKGROUND
Intel SGX. Intel SGX [44] is a user-space TEE, which is charac-
terized by flexible process-level isolation: a program component
can get into an enclave mode and be protected by execution isola-
tion, memory encryption and data sealing, against the threats from
the untrusted OS and processes running in other enclaves. Such
protection, however, comes with in-enclave resource constraints.
Particularly, only 128 MB encryption protected memory (called
Enclave Page Cache or EPC) is reserved for enclaves for each pro-
cessor. Although the virtual memory support is available, it incurs
significant overheads in paging.
Another problem caused by SGX’s flexibility design is a large
attack surface. When an enclave program contains memory vul-
nerabilities, attacks can happen to compromise enclave’s privacy
protection. Prior research demonstrates that a Return-Oriented-
Programming (ROP) attack can succeed in injecting malicious code
inside an enclave, which can be launched by the OS, Hypervi-
sor, or BIOS [20, 39, 56]. Another security risk is side-channel
leak [30, 40, 57], caused by the thin software stack inside an enclave
(for reducing TCB), which often has to resort to the OS for resource
management (e.g., paging, I/O control). Particularly, an OS-level
adversary can perform a controlled side channel attack (e.g., [78]).
Also in the threat model is the physical adversary, such as a system
administrator, who tries to gain unauthorized access to a TEEâĂŹs
computing units to compromise its integrity or confidentiality.
SGX remote attestation. As mentioned earlier, attestation allows
a remote user to verify that the enclave is correctly constructed and
run on a genuine SGX-enabled platform. In IntelâĂŹs attestation
model, three parties are involved: (1) the Independent Software
Vendor (ISV) who is registered to Intel as the enclave developer; (2)
the Intel Attestation Service (IAS) hosted by Intel to help enclave
verification, and (3) the SGX-enabled platform that operates SGX
enclaves. The attestation begins with the ISV sending an attestation
request challenge, which can be generated by an enclave user or a
data owner who wants to perform the attestation with the enclave
to check its state. Upon recipient of the challenge, the enclave then
generates a verification report including the enclave measurement,
which can be verified by a quoting enclave (QE) through local
attestation. The QE signs the report using the attestation key and
the generated quote is forwarded to the Intel Attestation Service
(IAS). The IAS then checks the quote and signs the verification result
using Intel’s private key. The ISV can then validate the attestation
result based upon the signature and the enclave measurement.
PCC. PCC is a software mechanism that allows a host system to
verify an application’s properties with a formal proof accompany-
ing the application’s executable code. Using PCC, the host system
is expected to quickly check the validity of the proof, and com-
pare the conclusions of the proof to its own security policies to
determine whether the application is safe to run. Traditional PCC
schemes tend to utilize formal verification for proof generation
and validation. Techniques for this purpose includes verification
condition generator/proof generator [26, 33], theorem prover/proof
assistant [19, 27, 50], and proof checker/verifier [15], which typi-
cally work on type-safe intermediate languages (IL) or higher level
languages. A problem here is that up to our knowledge, no formal
tool today can automatically transform a binary to IL for in-enclave
verification. BAP [21] disassembles binaries and lifts x86 instruc-
tions to a formal format, but it does not have a runtime C/C++
library for static linking, as required for an enclave program.
Moreover, the PCC architecture today relies on the correctness
of the VCGen and the proof checker, so a direct application of PCC
to confidential computing needs to include both in TCB. This is
problematic due to their complicated designs and implementations,
which are known to be error-prone [46]. Particularly, today’s VC-
Gens are built on interpreter/compiler or even virtual machine [41],
and therefore will lead to a huge TCB. Prior attempts [14] to move
VCGen out of TCB are found to have serious performance impacts,
due to the significantly increased proof size.
Actually, the proof produced by formal verification is typically
large, growing exponentially with the size of the program that needs
certified [45]. It is common to have a proof 1000 times larger than
the code [51]. Although techniques are there to reduce the proof
size [14, 51],they are complicated and increase the TCB size [15].
Therefore as far as we are aware, no existing PCC techniques can
be directly applied to enable the CAT model on today’s TEE.
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3 CONFIDENTIAL ATTESTATION
Consider an organization that provides data-processing services,
such as image editing (Pixlr), tax preparation (TurboTax), personal
health analysis (23andMe) and deep learning inference as a service.
To use the services, its customers need to upload their sensitive
data, such as images, tax documents, and health data, to the hosts
operated by the organization. To avoid exposing the data, the ser-
vices run inside SGX enclaves and need to prove to the customers
that they are only accessible to authorized service programs. How-
ever, the organization may not want to release the proprietary
programs to protect its intellectual property. This problem cannot
be addressed by today’s TEE design. In this section, we present
the Confidential ATtestation (CAT) model to allow the data owner
to verify that the enclave code satisfies predefined security policy
requirements without undermining the privacy of the enclave code.
DataCode
Code Provider
Bootstrap 
Enclave Attestation Service
Data Owner
Figure 1: The CAT model
3.1 The CAT Model
The CAT model can be described by the interactions among 4
parties, as follows:
Attestation service. Attestation service (AS) assists in the remote
attestation process by helping the data owner and/or the code
provider verify the quote generated by an enclave, as performed by
the Intel attestation service for SGX.
Bootstrap enclave. The boostrap enclave is a built-in control layer
on the software stack of an enclave supporting CAT (see Figure 1).
Its code is public and initial state is measured by hardware for
generating an attestation quote, which is later verified by the data
owner and the code provider with the help of the AS. This software
layer is responsible for establishing security channels with enclave
users, authenticating and dynamically loading the binary of the
target program from the code provider and data from its owner.
Further it verifies the code to ensure its compliance with predefined
security policies before bootstrapping the computation. During the
computing, it also controls the data entering or exiting the enclave,
e.g., through SGX ECalls and OCalls to perform data sanitization.
Data owner. The data owner uploads sensitive data (e.g., personal
images) to use in-enclave services (e.g., an image classifier) and
intends to keep her data secret during the computation. To this end,
the owner runs a remote attestation with the enclave to verify the
code of the bootstrap enclave, and sends in data through a secure
channel only when convinced that the enclave is in the right state
so expected policy compliance check will be properly performed
on the target binary from the code provider. Note that there could
be more than one data owner to provide data.
Code provider. The code provider (owner) can be the service
provider (Scenario 1 in Section 3.2), and in this case, her target
binary (the service code) can be directly handed over to the boot-
strap enclave for compliance check. In general, however, the code
provider is a different party and may not trust the service provider.
So, similar to the data owner, she can also request a remote attesta-
tion to verify the bootstrap enclave before delivering her binary to
the enclave for a compliance check.
3.2 Application Scenarios
The CAT model can be applied to the following scenarios to protect
both data and code privacy in computing.
Scenario 1: Confidential Computing as a Service. We consider
confidential computing as a service (CCaaS) as a privacy extension
of today’s online data processing services like machine-learning
as a service [54], as the example presented at the beginning of
the section. CCaaS is hosted by the party that operates its own
target binary on the data provided by its owner (e.g., an online
image classifier to label uploaded user photos). The outcome of the
computation will be sent back to the data owner. Here, the target
binary cannot be released for verification so needs to go through
an in-enclave compliance check.
Scenario 2: Confidential Data as a Service. In this scenario
(CDaaS), it is the data owner who hosts the online service. The
code provider dispatches her program (the target binary) to analyze
the data and get the result back, all through a secure channel. An
example is that a pharmaceutical company inspects the electronic
medical records on a hospital’s server to seek suitable candidates
for a drug trial. Here, the code provider wants to ensure that her
algorithm will be properly executed and will not be released, which
is done through a remote attestation to verify the bootstrap loader.
The data owner also needs to put a policy in place to control the
amount of information that can be given to the code provider.
Scenario 3: Confidential Data Computing Market. Another
scenario (called CDCM) is that the enclave is hosted by an untrusted
third party, a market platform, to enable data sharing and analysis.
In this case, both the data owner and the code provider upload to
the platform their individual content (data or code) through secure
channels. They all go through remote attestations to ensure the
correctness of the bootstrap enclave, which could also arrange pay-
ment transactions between the data owner and the code provider
through a smart contract.
3.3 Requirements for a CAT System
To instantiate the CAT model on a real-world TEE such as SGX, we
expect the following requirements to be met by the design:
Minimizing TCB. In the CAT model the bootstrap enclave is re-
sponsible for enforcing security and privacy policies and for con-
trolling the interfaces that import and export code/data for the
enclave. So it is critical for trust establishment and needs to be kept
as compact as possible for code inspection or verification.
Reducing resource consumption. Today’s TEEs operate under
resource constraints. Particularly, SGX is characterized by limited
EPC. To maintain reasonable performance, we expect that the soft-
ware stack of the CAT model controls its resource use.
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CDCM
Scenario 3
CDaaS
Scenario 2
CCaaS
Scenario 1
Code 
Provider
Code 
Provider
Code 
Provider
Data 
Owner
Data 
Owner
Data 
Owner
Figure 2: Scenarios
Controlling dynamic code loading. The target binary is dynam-
ically loaded and inspected by the bootstrap enclave. However, the
binary may further sideload other code during its runtime. Some
TEE hardware, SGX in particular, does not allow dynamic change
to enclave page’s RWX properties. So the target binary, itself loaded
dynamically, is executed on the enclave’s heap space. Preventing
it from sideloading requires a data execution prevention (DEP)
scheme to guarantee the W ⊕ X privilege.
Preventing malicious control flows. Since the target binary is
not trusted, the CAT software stack should be designed to prevent
the code from escaping policy enforcement by redirecting its con-
trol flow or tampering with the bootstrap enclave’s critical data
structures. Particularly, previous work shows that special SGX in-
structions like ENCLU could become unique gadgets for control
flow redirecting [20], which therefore need proper protection.
Minimizing performance impact. In all application scenarios,
the data owner and the code provider expect a quick turnaround
from code verification. Also the target binary’s performance should
not be significantly undermined by the runtime compliance check.
3.4 Threat Model
The CAT model is meant to establish trust between the enclave and
the code provider, as well as the data owner, under the following
assumptions:
•We do not trust the target binary (service code) and the platform
hosting the enclave. In CCaaS, the platform may deliberately run
vulnerable target binary to exfiltrate sensitive data, by exploiting
the known vulnerabilities during computation. The binary can also
leak the data through a covert channel (e.g., page fault [78]).
• Under the untrusted service provider, our model does not guar-
antee the correctness of the computation, since it is not meant to
inspect the functionalities of the target binary. Also, although TEE
is designed to prevent information leaks to the untrusted OS, denial
of service can still happen, which is outside the scope of the model.
•We assume that the code of the bootstrap enclave can be inspected
to verify its functionalities and correctness. Also we consider the
TEE hardware, its attestation protocol, and all underlying crypto-
graphic primitives to be trusted.
• Our model is meant to protect data and code against different
kinds of information leaks, not only explicit but also implicit. How-
ever, side channel for a user-land TEE (like SGX) is known to be
hard to eliminate. So our design for instantiating the model on SGX
(Section 4.2) can only mitigate some types of side-channel threats.
4 ENHANCING SGXWITH CAT
In this section we present our design, called CAT-SGX, that elevates
the SGX platform with the support for the CAT model. This is
done using an in-enclave software layer – the bootstrap enclave
running the code consumer and an out-enclave auxiliary – the code
generator. Following we first describe the general idea behind our
design and then elaborate the policies it supports, its individual
components and potential extension.
4.1 CAT-SGX: Overview
Idea. Behind the design of CAT-SGX is the idea of PCC, which
enables efficient in-enclave verification of the target binary’s policy
compliance on the proof generated for the code. A direct application
of the existing PCC techniques, however, fails to serve our purpose,
as mentioned earlier, due to the huge TCB introduced, the large
proof size and the exponential time with regards to the code size for
proof generation. To address these issues, we design a lightweight
PCC-type approach with an untrusted code producer and a trusted
code consumer running inside the bootstrap enclave. The producer
compiles the source code of the target program (for service provid-
ing), generates a list of its indirect jump targets, and instruments it
with security annotations for runtime mediation of its control flow
and key operations, in compliance with security policies. The list
and security annotations constitute a “proof”, which is verified by
the consumer after loading the code into the enclave and before
the target binary is activated.
Bootstrap Enclave
Code Producer
Code Generator
(LLVM)
Source Program
Security Policies
Target binary with Proof
Code
(Target binary)
+
Proof
(Security annotation,
Indirect branch target)
Loader and Verifier
Tr
us
te
d 
SGX-enabled Platform
U
nt
ru
st
ed
 
tRTS Library
Code Consumer
Figure 3: System overview
Architecture. The architecture of CAT-SGX is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. The code generator and the binary and proof it produced are
all considered untrusted. Only in the TCB is the code consumer
with two components: a dynamic-loader operating a rewriter for
re-locating the target binary, and a proof verifier running a dis-
assembler for checking the correct instrumentation of security
annotations. These components are all made public and can there-
fore be measured for a remote attestation (Section 5.2). They are
designed to minimize their code size, by moving most workload to
the code producer.
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Policy-Compliant Code Generation
Dynamic Code Loading Compliance Verification
1. Compiling and Linking
Policies on 
Memory Operations
Policies 
on CFI
Policies on Side/ 
Covert Channels
Attestated Bootstrap Enclave
Target Binary 
with Proof
“0101010101010
10100101010100
1001011100....”
Source Code
...
int main() {
    ...
} ELF header
Header table
Section 1
2. Binary Parsing Assembly
“...
 subq $8, (%r11)
 movq (%r10), %r11
 cmpq %r11, (%rsp)
 jne exit_label
 ret
 ...”
5. Imms 
Rewriting
ELF header
Header table
Segment 1
...
3. Relocation
4. Policy 
Checking
...
“...
 subq $8, (%r11)
 movq (%r10), %r11
 cmpq %r11, (%rsp)
 jne exit_label
--------------------------- 
ret
 ...”
Figure 4: Detailed framework and workflow
We present the workflow of CAT-SGX in Figure 4. The target pro-
gram (the service code) is first instrumented by the code producer,
which runs a customized LLVM-based compiler (step 1). Then the
target binary with the proof (security annotations and the jump
target list) are delivered to the enclave through a secure channel.
The code is first parsed (step 2) and then disassembled from the
binary’s entry along with its control flow traces. After that, the
proof with the assembly inspected by the verifier and if correct
(step 3) before some immdiates being rewriten (step 4), is further
relocated and activated by the dynamic loader (Step 5). Finally, after
the bootstrap transfers the execution to the target program, the
service begins and policies are checked at runtime.
4.2 Security Policies
Without exposing its code for verification, the target binary needs to
be inspected for compliance with security policies by the bootstrap
enclave. These policies are meant to protect the privacy of sensitive
data, to prevent its unauthorized disclosure. The current design of
CAT-SGX supports the policies in the following five categories:
Enclave entry and exit control. CAT-SGX can mediate the con-
tent imported to or exported from the enclave, through the ECall
and OCall interfaces, for the purposes of reducing the attack surface
and controlling information leaks.
• P0: Input constraint, output encryption and entropy control. We
restrict the ECall interfaces to just serving the purposes of upload-
ing data and code, which perform authentication, decryption and
optionally input sanitization (or a simple length check). Also only
some types of system calls are allowed through OCalls. Particularly,
all network communication through OCalls should be encrypted
with proper session keys (with the data owner or the code provider).
For CCaaS, the data owner can demand that only one OCall (for
sending back results to the owner) be allowed. For CDaaS, the data
owner can further impose the constraint on the amount of informa-
tion (number of bits) that can be returned to the code provider: e.g.,
one bit to indicate whether suitable patients for a drug trial exist
or one byte to tell the number.
Memory leak control. Information leak can happen through unau-
thorized write to the memory outside the enclave, which should be
prohibited through the code inspection.
• P1: Preventing explicit out-enclave memory stores. This policy pre-
vents the target binary from writing outside the enclave, which
could be used to expose sensitive data. It can be enforced by secu-
rity annotations through mediation on the destination addresses
of memory store instructions (such as MOV) to ensure that they are
within the enclave address range ELRANGE).
• P2: Preventing implicit out-enclave memory stores. Illicit RSP regis-
ter save/spill operations can also leak sensitive information to the
out-enclave memory by pushing a register value to the address spec-
ified by the stack pointer, which is prohibited through inspecting
the RSP content.
• P3: Preventing unauthorized change to security-critical data within
the bootstrap enclave. This policy ensures that the security-critical
data would never be tampered with by the untrusted code.
• P4: Preventing runtime code modification. Since the target code
is untrusted and loaded into the enclave during its operation, un-
der SGXv1, the code can only be relocated to the pages with RWX
properties. So software-based DEP protection should be in place to
prevent the target binary from changing itself or uploading other
code at runtime.
Control-flow management. To ensure that security annotations
and other protection cannot be circumvented at runtime, the con-
trol flow of the target binary should not be manipulated. For this
purpose, the following policy should be enforced:
• P5: Preventing manipulation of indirect branches to violate policies
P1 to P4. This policy is to protect the integrity of the target binary’s
control flow, so security annotations cannot be bypassed. To this
end, we need to mediate all indirect control transfer instructions,
including indirect calls and jumps, and return instructions.
AEX based side/covert channel mitigation. SGX’s user-land
TEE design exposes a large side-channel surface, which cannot be
easily eliminated. In the meantime, prior research shows that many
side-channel attacks cause Asynchronous Enclave Exits (AEXs).
Examples include the controlled side channel attack [78] that relies
on triggering page faults, and the attacks on L1/L2 caches [74],
which requires context switches to schedule between the attack
thread and the enclave thread, when Hyper-threading is turned off
or a co-location test is performed before running the binary [25].
CAT-SGX is capable of integrating existing solutions to mitigate
the side- or covert-channel attacks in this category.
• P6: Controlling the AEX frequency. The policy requires the total
number of the AEX concurrences to keep below a threshold during
the whole computation. Once the AEX is found to be too frequent,
above the threshold, the execution is terminated to prevent further
information leak.
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4.3 Policy-Compliant Code Generation
As mentioned earlier, the design of CAT-SGX is to move the work-
load from in-enclave verification to out-enclave generation of policy-
compliant binary and its proof (security annotations and the list of
indirect jump targets). In this section we describe the design of the
code generator, particularly how it analyzes and instruments the
target program so that security policies (P1~P6, see Section 4.2) can
be enforced during the program’s runtime. Customized policies for
purposes other than privacy can also be translated into proof and
be enforced flexibly.
Enforcing P1. The code generator is built on top of the LLVM com-
piler framework (Section 5.1). When compiling the target program
(in C) into binary, the code generator identifies (through the LLVM
API MachineInstr::mayStore()) all memory storing operation
instructions (e.g., MOV, Scale-Index-Base (SIB) instructions) and fur-
ther inserts annotation code before each instruction to check its
destination address and ensure that it does not write outside the
enclave at runtime. The boundaries of the enclave address space can
be obtained during dynamic code loading, which is provided by the
loader (Section 4.4). The correct instrumentation of the annotation
is later verified by the code consumer inside the enclave.
Enforcing P2. The generator locates all instructions that explicitly
modify the stack pointer (the RSP in X86 arch) from the binary (e.g.,
a MOV changing its content) and inserts annotations to check the
validity of the stack pointer after them. This protection, including
the content of the annotations and their placement, is verified by the
code consummer (Section 4.4). Note that RSP can also be changed
implicitly, e.g., through pushing oversized objects onto the stack.
This violation is prevented by the loader (Section 4.4), which adds
guard pages (pages without permission) around the stack.
Enforcing P3. Similar to the enforcement of P1 and P2, the code
generator inserts security annotations to prevent (both explicit and
implicit) memory write operations on security-critical enclave data
(e.g., SSA/TLS/TCS) once the untrusted code is loaded and verified.
These annotation instructions are verified later by the verifier.
Enforcing P4. To prevent the target binary from changing its own
code at runtime, the code generator instruments all its write opera-
tions (as identified by the APIs readsWritesVirtualRegister()
and mayStore()) with the annotations that disallow alternation of
code pages. Note that the code of the target binary has to be placed
on RWX pages by the loader under SGXv1 and its stack and heap are
assigned to RW pages (see Sec. 4.4), so runtime code modification
cannot be stopped solely by page-level protection (though code
execution from the data region is defeated by the page permissions).
Enforcing P5. To control indirect calls or indirect jumps in the
target program, the code generator extracts all labels from its binary
during compilation and instruments security annotations before
related instructions to ensure that only these labels can serve as
legitimate jump targets. The locations of these labels should not
allow an instrumented security annotations to be bypassed. Also
to prevent the backward-edge control flow manipulation (through
RET), the generator injects annotations after entry into and before
return from every function call to operate on a shadow stack (see
Figure 14), which is allocated during code loading. Also all the
legitimate labels are replaced by the loader when relocating the
target binary. Such annotations are then inspected by the verifier
when disassembling the binary to ensure that protection will not
be circumvented by control-flow manipulation (Section 4.4).
Enforcing P6 with SSA inspection. When an exception or inter-
rupt take place during enclave execution, an AEX is triggered by
the hardware to save the enclave context (such as general registers)
to the state saving area (SSA). This makes the occurrence of the
AEX visible [25, 31]. Specifically, the code generator can enforce
the side-channel mitigation policy by instrumenting every basic
block with an annotation that sets a marker in the SSA and moni-
tors whether the marker is overwritten, which happens when the
enclave context in the area has been changed, indicating that an
AEX has occurred. Through counting the number of consecutive
AEXes, the protected target binary can be aborted in the presence
of anomalously frequent interrupts. This protection can also be
verified by the code consumer before the binary is allowed to run
inside the enclave.
Code loading support. Loading the binary is a procedure that
links the binary to external libraries and relocates the code. For a
self-contained function (i.e., one does not use external elements),
compiling and sending the bytes of the assembled code is enough.
However, if the function wants to use external elements but not
supported inside an enclave (e.g., a system call), a distributed code
loading support mechanism is needed. In our design, the loading
procedure is divided into two parts, one (linking) outside and the
other (relocation) inside the enclave.
Our code generator assembles all the symbols of the entire code
(including necessary libraries and dependencies) into one relocat-
able file via static linking. While linking all object files generated
by the LLVM, it keeps all symbols and relocation information held
in relocatable entries. The relocatable file, as above-mentioned
target binary, is expected to be loaded for being relocated later
(Section 4.4).
4.4 Configuration, Loading and Verification
With the annotations instrumented and legitimate jump targets
identified, the in-enclave workload undertaken by the bootstrap
enclave side has been significantly reduced. Still, it needs to be
properly configured to enforce the policy (P0) that cannot be imple-
mented by the code generator, load and relocate the target binary so
instrumented protection can be properly executed and also verify
the “proof” for policy compliance through efficient dissembling and
inspecting the binary. Following we elaborate how these critical
operations are supported by our design.
Enclave configuration to enforce P0. To enforce the input con-
straint, we need to configure the enclave by defining certain public
ECalls in Enclave Definition Language (EDL) files for data and code
secure delivery. Note such a configuration, together with other
security settings, can be attested to the remote data owner or code
provider. The computation result of the in-enclave service is en-
crypted using a session key (with the data owner or code provider)
after the remote attestation and is sent out through a customized
OCall. For this purpose, CAT-SGX only defines allowed system
calls (e.g., send/recv) in the EDL file, together with their wrappers
for security control. Specially, the wrapper for send encrypts the
message to be delivered and pads it to a fixed length.
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To support the CCaaS setting, only send and recv are allowed to
communicate with the data owner. When necessary, the wrappers
of these functions can pad the encrypted output and ensure that
the inter-packet timings are constant to mitigate the side-channel
risk. For CDaaS, we only permit a send OCall to be invoked once
to deliver the computing result to the code provider, which can be
enforced by the wrapper of the function through a counter. Further
the wrapper can put a constraint on the length of the result to
control the amount of information disclosed to the code provider:
e.g., only 8 bits can be sent out.
Dynamic code loading and unloading. The target binary is de-
livered into the enclave as data through an ECall, processed by
the wrapper placed by CAT-SGX, which authenticates the sender
and then decrypts the code before handing it over to the dynamic
loader. The primary task of the loader is to rebase all symbols of the
binary according to its relocation information (Section 4.3). For this
purpose, the loader first parses the binary to retrieve its relocation
tables, then updates symbol offsets, and further reloads the symbols
to designated addresses. During this loading procedure, the indirect
branch label list is “translated” to in-enclave addresses, which are
considered to be legitimate branch targets and later used for policy
compliance verification.
As mentioned earlier (Section 4.3), the code section of the target
binary is placed on pages with RWX privileges, since under SGXv1,
the page permissions cannot be changed during an enclave’s opera-
tion, while the data sessions (stack, heap) are assigned to the pages
with RW privileges. These code pages for the binary are guarded
against any write operation by the annotations for enforcing P4.
Other enclave code, including that of the code consumer, is under
the RX protection through enclave configuration. Further the loader
assigns two non-writable blank guard pages right before and after
the target binary’s stack for enforcing P2, and also reserves pages
for hosting the list of legitimate branch targets and the shadow
stack for enforcing P5.
Just-enough disassembling and verification. After loading and
relocating, the target binary is passed to the verifier for a policy
compliance check. Such a verification is meant to be highly efficient,
together with a lightweight disassembler. Specifically, our disas-
sembler is designed to leverage the assistance provided by the code
generator. It starts from the program entry discovered by the parser
and follows its control flow until an indirect control flow transfer,
such as indirect jump or call, is encountered. Then, it utilizes all the
legitimate target addresses on the list to continue the disassembly
and control-flow inspection. In this way, the whole program will
be quickly and comprehensively examined.
For each indirect branch, the verifier checks the annotation code
(Figure 4.3) right before the branch operation, which ensures that
the target is always on the list at runtime. Also, these target ad-
dresses, together with direct branch targets, are compared with all
guarded operations in the code to detect any attempt to evade secu-
rity annotations.With such verification, wewill have the confidence
that no hidden control transfers will be performed by the binary, al-
lowing further inspection of other instrumented annotations. These
annotations are expected to be well formatted and located around
the critical operations as described in Section 4.3. Figure 6 presents
an example and more details are given in Section 5.1 and Appendix.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the prototype on Linux/X86 arch. Specifically, we
implemented the code generator with LLVM 9.0.0, and built other
parts on an SGX environment.
We implemented one LLVM back-end pass consisting of several
types of instrumentations for the code generator, about 1200 lines
of C++ code in total. Besides, we implemented the bootstrap en-
clave with over 1900 lines of code based on Capstone [2] as the
disassembler.
5.1 Assembly-level Instrumentation
Source	File Clang LLVM	IR LLVM Asm	File
Backend	Pass
Shadow	Stack
instrumentation
Forward-edge	branch
instrumentation
Memory	storing
instrumentation
RSP	modifing
instrumentation
IR	PassSSA	monitoringinstrumentation
Figure 5: Detailed workflow of the code generator
The code generator we built is mainly based on LLVM (Fig. 5),
and the assembly-level instrumentation is the core module. To
address the challenge of limited computing resources described in
Section 3.3, this code generator tool is designed and implemented
comprehensively, to make the policy verifier small and exquisite.
More specifically, we implemented modules for checking memory
writing instructions, RSP modification, indirect branches and for
building shadow stack. And we reformed a instrumentation module
to generate side-channel-resilient annotations. Note that we can
not only demonstrate the security policies for several real-world
scenarios can be efficiently enforced with our framework, modules
of the annotation generation for customized functionalities can also
be integrated into the code generator. For convenience, switches to
turn on/off these modules are made.
Here is an example. The main function of the module for check-
ing explicit memory write instructions (P1) is to insert annotations
before them. Suppose there is such a memory write instruction in
the target program, ‘mov reg, [reg+imm]’, the structured annota-
tion first sets the upper and lower bounds as two temporary Imms
(3ffffffffffff and 4ffffffffffff), and then compares the address of the
destination operand with the bounds. The real upper/lower bounds
of the memory write instruction are specified by the loader later.
If our instrumentation finds the memory write instruction trying
to write data to illegal space, it will cause the program to exit at
runtime. The code snippet (structured format of the annotation) is
shown in Figure 6. More details can be found at Appendix .1.
Although using the code generator we could automatically pro-
duce an instrumented object file, we still need to deal with some
issues manually that may affect practical usage. As the workflow
described in Figure 4, the first job to make use of CAT system is
preparing the target binary. Service-specific libraries and some
dependencies also should be built and linked against the target
program (detailed in Appendix .2).
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1 pushq %rbx ; save e x e cu t i on s t a t u s
2 pushq %rax
3 l e a q [ reg+imm] , %rax ; l o ad the operand
4 movq $0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF , %rbx ; s e t bounds
5 cmpq %rbx , %rax
6 j a e x i t _ l a b e l
7 movq $0x4FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF , %rbx ; s e t bounds
8 cmpq %rbx , %rax
9 j b e x i t _ l a b e l
10 popq %rax
11 popq %rbx
Figure 6: Store instruction instrumentation
5.2 Building Bootstrap Enclave
Following the design in Section 4.4, we implemented a Dynamic
Loading after RA mechanism for the bootstrap enclave. During the
whole service, the data owner can only see the attestation messages
which are related with the bootstrap’s enclave quote, but nothing
about service providerâĂŹs code.
Code
Indirect Branch List
Loader / Verifier
Reserved for
Rebased Program
Heap for 
Loader / Verifier
Others
Enclave
Code
Indirect
Branch List
Relocatable
Target Program
Indirect Branch List
Loader / Verifier
Heap for 
Loader / Verifier
Others
Enclave
Code
Shadow Stack
1. Receive with
ECALLs
2. In-enclave
Rebase
RWX
with
DEP
Figure 7: Detailed workflow of the dynamic loader
Remote attestation. Once the bootstrap enclave is initiated, it
needs to be attested. We leverage the original RA routine [6] and
adjust it to our design. The original RA routine requires that the
host, which is assumed to run the enclave as the ‘client’, initiates the
attestation towards the ‘server’, who owns the data. While in this
CCaaS scenario, the service runs in the enclave while the remote
user owns the data. So, we modify this routine to enable a remote
CCaaS user to initiate the attestation.
The RA procedures can be invoked by calling sgx_ra_init()
inside the service providerâĂŹs enclave after secret provision be-
tween the remote user and the service provider. After obtaining an
enclave quote of the bootstrap enclave which is signed with the
platform’s EPID key, the remote data owner can submit the quote
to IAS and obtain an attestation report.
Dynamic loader. When the RA is finished, the trust between data
owner and the bootstrap enclave is established. Then the user can
locally/remotely call the Ecall (ecall_receive_binary) to load
the service binary instrumented with security annotations and the
indirect branch list without knowing the code. User data is loaded
from untrusted memory into the trusted enclave memory when the
user remotely calls Ecall (ecall_receive_userdata), to copy the
data to the section reserved for it.
Then, the dynamic loader in the bootstrap enclave loads and
relocates the generated code. The indirect branch list, which is
comprised of symbol names that will be checked in indirect branch
instrumentations, will be resolved at the very beginning. In our im-
plementation, there are both 4M memory space for storing indirect
branch targets, as well as for shadow stack. And we reserve 64M
memory space for received binary and for ‘.data’ section. The heap
base address is slightly larger than the end of received binary, and
0x27000 Bytes (156 KB) space is reserved for the loader’s own heap.
After relocation, the detailed memory layout and some key steps
are shown in Figure 7.
Policy verifier. The policy-compliance verifier, is composed with
three components - a clipped disassembler, a verifier, and a imme-
diate operand rewritter.
• Clipped disassembler. We enforce each policy mostly at assembly
level. Thus, we incorporate a lightweight disassembler inside the
enclave. To implement the disassembler, we remove unused com-
ponents of this existing wide-used framework, and use Recursive
Descent Disassembly to traverse the code. We used the diet mode, in
which some non-critical data are removed, thus making the engine
size at least 40% smaller [53].
• Policy verifier. The verifier and the following rewriter do the work
just right after the target binary is disassembled, according the struc-
tured guard formats provided by our code generator. The verifier
uses a simple scanning algorithm to ensure the policies applied in
assembly language instrumentation. Specifically, the verifier scans
the whole assembly recursively along with the disassembler. It fol-
lows the clipped disassembler to scan instrumentations before/after
certain instructions are in place, and checks if there is any branch
target pointing between instructions in those instrumentations.
• Imm rewriter. One last but not least step before executing the
target binary code is to resolve and replace the Imm operands
in instrumentations, including the base of the shadow stack, and
the addresses of indirect branch targets (i.e. legal jump addresses).
For example, the genuine base address of shadow stack is the start
address __ss_start of the memory space reserved by the bootstrap
enclave for the shadow stack. And the ranges are determined using
functions of Intel SGX SDK during dynamic loading (Section 4.4).
We use the simplest way to rewrite Imm operands. Table 1 shows
what the specific values should be before and after rewriting, re-
spectively. The first column of table 1 shows the target we need
to rewrite while loading. For instance, the upper bound address
of data section would be decided during loading, but it would be
3ffffffffffffffff (shown in the 2nd. column) during the proof genera-
tion and will be modified to the real upper data bound address. The
third column shows the variable name used in our prototype.
6 EVALUATION
In this section we report our security analysis and performance
evaluation of CAT-SGX.
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Table 1: Fields to be rewritten
Target imm description From To
Upper bound of data section 3ffffffffffffffff upper_data_bound
Lower bound of data section 4ffffffffffffffff lower_data_bound
Upper bound of stack 5ffffffffffffffff upper_stack_bound
Lower bound of stack 6ffffffffffffffff lower_stack_bound
Upper bound of code section 7ffffffffffffffff lower_code_bound
Lower bound of code section 8ffffffffffffffff lower_code_bound
# of indirect branch targets 1ffffffff branch_target_idx
Addr. of branch target list 1ffffffffffffffff __branch_target
Addr. of the shadow stack 2ffffffffffffffff __ss_start
6.1 Security Analysis
TCB analysis. The hardware TCB of CAT-SGX includes the TEE-
enabled platform, i.e. the SGX hardware. The software TCB includes
the following components to build the bootstrap enclave.
• Loader and verifier. The loader we implemented consists of less
than 600 lines of code (LoCs) and the verifier includes less than
700 LoCs, which also integrates SGX SDK and part of Capstone
libraries.
• ECall/OCall stubs for supporting P0. This was implemented in less
than 500 LoCs.
• Simple RA protocol realization. The implementation (Section 5.2)
introduces about 200 LoCs.
Altogether, our software TCB contains less than 2000 LoCs and
some dependencies, which was compiled into a self-contained bi-
nary with 1.9 MB in total.
Policy analysis. Here we show how the policies on the untrusted
code, once enforced, prevent information leaks from the enclaves.
In addition to side channels, there are two possible ways for a data
operation to go across the enclave boundaries: bridge functions [72]
and memory write.
• Bridge functions. With the enforcement of P0, the loaded code can
only invoke our OCall stubs, which prevents the leak of plaintext
data through encryption and controls the amount of information
that can be sent out (to the code provider in CDaaS).
•Memory write operations. All memory writes, both direct memory
store and indirect register spill, are detected and blocked. Addition-
ally, software DEP is deployed so the code cannot change itself. Also
the control-flow integrity (CFI) policy, P5, prevents the attacker
from bypassing the checker with carefully constructed gadgets by
limiting the control flow to only legitimate target addresses.
As such, possible ways of information leak to the outside of the
enclave are controlled. As proved by previous works [66, 67] the
above-mentioned policies (P1~P5) guarantee the property of confi-
dentiality. Furthermore the policy (P5) of protecting return addresses
and indirect control flow transfer, together with preventing writes to
outside has been proved to be adequate to construct the confine-
ment [55, 66]. So, enforcement of the whole set of policies from
P0 to P5 is sound and complete in preventing explicit information
leaks. In the meantime, our current design is limited in side-channel
protection. We can mitigate the threats of page-fault based attacks
and exploits on L1/L2 cache once Hyper-threading is turned off
or HyperRace [25] is incorporated (P6). However, defeating the
attacks without triggering interrupts, such as inference through
LLC is left for future research.
6.2 Performance Evaluation
Testbed setup. In our research, we evaluated the performance of
our prototype and tested its code generation and code execution. All
experiments were conducted on Ubuntu 18.04 (Linux kernel version
4.4.0) with SGX SDK 2.5 installed on Intel Xeon CPU E3-1280 with
64GB memory. Also we utilized GCC 5.4.0 to build the bootstrap
enclave and the SGX application, and the parameters ‘-fPIC’, ‘-fno-
asynchronous-unwind-tables’, ‘-fno-addrsig’, and ‘-mstackrealign’
to generate X86 binaries.
Performance on simple applications. We used the applications
provided by the SGX-Shield project [58] as a micro-benchmark. In
our experiment, we ran each test case for 10 times, measured the
resource consumption in each case and reported the median value.
Specifically, we first set the baseline as the performance of an unin-
strumented program running through a pure loader (a loader that
only does the dynamic loading but no policy-compliance checking).
The we compared the baseline with the performance of instru-
mented programs to measure the overheads. Also the compilation
time of each micro-benchmark varies from several seconds to tens
of seconds, which is negligible compared with conventional PCC
methods (2~5×) [46].
Table 2 illustrates overheads of our approach. From the table,
we can see that the size of instrumented binaries (aka. the “code +
proof”) is 18.1% larger than the original code and their executions
were delayed by 9.8% on average when only P1~P5 are enforced.
It becomes 130% in memory and 119% in time when all policies,
including P6, are enforced. Note that this batch of benchmarks
are mostly a ‘first-simple-processing-then-syscall’ program. At the
worst case - ‘bm_malloc_and_sort’, CAT-SGX showed 27.6% over-
head in execution time.
Performance on nBench. We instrumented all applications in the
SGX-nBench [9], and ran each testcase of the nBench suites under
a few settings, each for 10 times. These settings include just explicit
memory write check (P1), both explicit memory write check and
implicit stack write check (P1+P2), all memory write and indirect
branch check (P1~P5), and together with side channel mitigation
(P1~P6).
Table 3 shows the average execution time under different set-
tings. Without side channel mitigation (P1~P5), CAT-SGX intro-
duces an 0.3% to 25% overhead (on FP-emulation). Apparently, the
store instruction instrumentation alone (P1) does not cause a large
performance overhead, with largest being 6.7%. Also, when P1 and
P2 are applied together, the overhead just becomes slightly higher
than P1 is enforced alone. Besides, almost all benchmarks in nBench
perform well under the CFI check P5 (less than 3%) except for the
benchmarks Bitfield (whose overhead is about 4%) and the Assign-
ment (about 10% due to its frequent memory access pattern).
Performance on real-world applications. We further evaluated
our prototype on various real-world applications, including per-
sonal health data analysis, personal financial data analysis, and
Web servers. We implemented those macro-benchmarks and mea-
sured the differences between their baseline performance (without
instrumentation) in enclave and the performance of our prototype.
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Table 2: Binary code size and execution time of simple applications
Application Name Size Size (P1~P5) Size (P1~P6) Execution Time Execution Time (P1~P5) Execution Time (P1~P6)
bm_clock 209KB 217KB (+3.83%) 218KB (+4.31%) 1.271s 1.457s (+14.6%) 1.469s (+15.8%)
bm_malloc_and_magic 227KB 237KB (+4.41%) 239KB (+5.29%) 1.343s 1.537s (+14.4%) 1.638s (+22.0%)
bm_malloc_memalign 229KB 240KB (+4.80%) 242KB (+5.68%) 1.278s 1.467s (+14.8%) 1.567s (+22.6%)
bm_malloc_and_sort 208KB 222KB (+6.73%) 225KB (+8.17%) 1.270s 1.473s (+16.0%) 1.620s (+27.6%)
bm_memcpy 4.7KB 7.9KB (+68.1%) 11KB (+134%) 1.211s 1.247s (+2.97%) 1.396s (+15.3%)
bm_memchr 5.2KB 8.3KB (+59.6%) 11KB (+116%) 1.210s 1.251s (+3.39%) 1.391s (+15.0%)
bm_sprintf 70KB 74KB (+5.71%) 76KB (+8.57%) 1.218s 1.299s (+6.65%) 1.440s (+18.2%)
bm_sort_and_binsearch 89KB 98KB (+10.1%) 102KB (+14.6%) 1.234s 1.314s (+6.48%) 1.460s (+18.3%)
Table 3: Performance evaluation on nBench
Program Name Baseline P1~P5 P1~P6
NUMERIC SORT 1487µs 1588µs (+6.79%) 1665µs (+12.0%)
STRING SORT 8460µs 9507µs (+12.4%) 10.02ms (+18.4%)
BITFIELD 46.83ns 54.10ns (+15.5%) 55.23ns (+17.9%)
FP EMULATION 14.93ms 14.98ms (+0.33%) 15.73ms (+5.36%)
FOURIER 34.22µs 35.21µs (+2.89%) 36.77µs (+7.45%)
ASSIGNMENT 43.52ms 54.41ms (+25.0%) 60.85ms (+39.8%)
IDEA 342.2µs 352.9µs (+3.13%) 385.7µs (+12.1%)
HUFFMAN 550.1µs 649.6µs (+18.1%) 667.1µs (+21.3%)
NEURAL NET 49.44ms 59.43ms (+20.2%) 60.84ms (+23.1%)
LU DECOMPOSITION 1024µs 1123µs (+9.67%) 1255µs (+22.6%)
• Sensitive health data analysis. We studied the following two appli-
cations:
1) Sequence Alignment. We implemented the NeedlemanâĂŞWun-
sch algorithm [47] that aligns two human genomic sequences in the
FASTA format [5] taken from the 1000 Genomes project [1]. The
algorithm uses dynamic programming to compute recursively a
two dimensional matrix of similarity scores between subsequences;
as a result, it takes N 2 memory space where N is the length of the
two input sequences.
Again, we measured the program execution time under the afore-
mentioned settings. Figure 8 shows the performance of the algo-
rithm with different input lengths (x-axis). The overall overhead
(including all kinds of instrumentations) is no more than 20% (with
the P1 alone no more than 10%), when input size is small (less than
200 Bytes). When input size is greater than 500 Bytes, the overhead
of P1+P2 is about 19.7% while P1~P5 spends 22.2% more time than
the baseline.
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Figure 8: Performance on sequence alignment
2) Sequence Generation. We re-implemented the FASTA bench-
mark [4], which is designed to simulate DNA sequences based on
pre-defined nucleotide frequencies. The program can output the
nucleotide sequences of length 2N , 3N and 5N , where N is used to
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Figure 9: Performance on sequence generation
measure the output size. Figure 9 shows the performance when the
output size (x-axis) varies from 1K to 500K nucleotides. Enforcing
P1 alone results in 5.1% and 6.9% overheads when 1K and 100K
are set as the output lengths. When the output size is 200K, our
prototype yields less than 20% overhead. Even when the side chan-
nel mitigation is applied, the overhead becomes just 25%. With the
increase of processing data size, the overhead of the system also
escalates; however, the overall performance remains acceptable.
• Personal credit score analysis. We further looked into another re-
alistic and more complicated workload. Credit scoring is a typical
application that needs to be protected more carefully - both the
credit card holder’s cost calendar and card issuer’s scoring algo-
rithm need to be kept secret. In our study, we implemented a BP
neural network-based credit scoring algorithm [37] that calculates
user’s credit scores. The input file contains users’ history records
and the output is a prediction whether the bank should approve
the next transaction. The model was trained on 10000 records and
then used to make prediction (i.e., output a confidence probability)
on different test cases.
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As shown in Figure 10, on 1000 and 10000 records, enforcement
of P1~P5 would yields around 15% overhead.While processing more
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than 50000 records, the overhead of the full check does not exceed
20%. The overhead of P1~P6 does not exceed 10% when processing
100K records.
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Figure 11: Performance on HTTPS server
• HTTPS server. We also built an HTTPS server to run in enclave
using the mbed TLS library [7]. Our protection only allows two
system calls (send/recv) to be executed via the OCall stubs for
client/server communication. A client executes a stress test tool
- Siege [10] - on another host in an isolated LAN. Siege was con-
figured to send continuous HTTPS requests (with no delay be-
tween two consecutive ones) to the web server for 10 minutes. We
measured its performance in the presence of different concurrent
connections to understand how our instrumented HTTPS server
implementation would perform.
Figure 11 shows the response times and throughput when all
policies are applied to the HTTPS server benchmark. When the
concurrent connections are less than 75, the instrumented HTTPS
server has similar performance of the in-enclave https server with-
out instrumentation. When the concurrency increases to 100, the
performance goes down to some extent. While after the concur-
rency increases to 150, the response time of instrumented server
goes up significantly. On average, enforcing P1~P6 results in 14.1%
overhead in the response time. As for throughput, when the number
of the concurrent connections is between 75 and 200, the overhead
is less than 10%. These experiments on realistic workloads show
that all policies, including side-channel mitigation, can be enforced
at only reasonable cost.
7 DISCUSSION
In previous sections we have shown that the design of CAT offers
lightweight and efficient in-enclave verification of privacy policy
compliance. Here we discuss some extensions.
Supporting other side/covert channel defenses. In Section 4.3,
we talked about policy enforcement approaches for side channel
resilience. It demonstrated that our framework can take various
side channel mitigation approaches to generate code carried with
proof. Besides AEX based mitigations which we learnt from Hyper-
race [25], others [13, 28, 31, 49, 61, 73, 76] can also be transformed
and incorporated into the CAT design. Even though new attacks
have been kept being proposed and there is perhaps no definitive
and practical solutions to all side/covert channel attacks, we believe
eventually some efforts can be integrated in our work.
Supporting SGXv2. Our approach currently relies on SGXv1 in-
structions that prevents dynamically changing page permissions
using a software DEP. The design could be simplified with SGXv2
instructions [43] since dynamic memory management inside an
enclave is allowed and protected in SGXv2 hardware. However,
Intel has not shipped SGXv2 CPUs widely. So we implement the
CAT model on SGXv1 to maximize its compatibility.
Supporting multi-user. Currently we only support single user
scenarios. Of course for multi-user scenarios, we can easily add a
data cleansing policy which ensures that once the task for one data
owner ends, all her data will be removed from the enclave before
the next owner’s data is loaded, together with the content of SSA
and registers, while not destroying the bootstrap enclave after use.
Further, to fully support multi-user in-enclave services, we need to
ensure each user’s session key remains secret and conduct remote
attestation for every user when they switch. Hardware features
like Intel MPX [59] can be applied to enforce memory permission
integrity [79], as a supplementary boundary checking mechanism.
Supporting multi-threading. When taking multi-threading into
account, the proof generation process become more complicated
and cumbersome [32]. Furthermore, multi-threading would intro-
duce serious bugs [75]. However, auditing memory read operations
from other threads seems taking the multi-threading leakage once
and for all. Actually, if we don’t prevent attacks mentioned in CON-
Firm [77], the proof enforcement of CFI is still broken due to a time
of check to time of use (TOCTTOU) problem. To cope with that,
we can make all CFI metadata to be read from a register instead of
the stack, and guarantee that the instrumented proof could not be
written by any threads [22].
Supporting on-demand policies. The framework of our system
is highly flexible, which means assembling new policies into current
design can be very straightforward. Different on-demand policies
can be appended/withdrawn to serve various goals. For example,
we can attach additional instrumentation to the code and the policy
enforcement to the in-enclave verifier in case of the discovery of
new side/covert channels and newly-published security flaws. CAT
can make the quick patch possible on software level, just like the
way people coping with 1-day vulnerabilities - emergency quick
fix. Besides, users can also customize the policy according to their
need, e.g., to verify code logic and its functionalities.
8 RELATEDWORK
Secure computing using SGX. Many existing works propose us-
ing SGX to secure cloud computing systems, e.g., VC3 [55], TVM [36],
by using sand-boxing [35], containers [16], and library OSes [60, 70].
These systems relies on remote attestation to verify the platform
and the enclave code, as a result, they either do not protect the code
privacy or they consider a one-party scenario, i.e., the code and
data needed for the computation are from the same participant. In
contrast, we consider 3 real world scenarios (CCaaS, CDaaS and
CDCM) protecting code and data from multiple distrustful parties.
Data confinement with SFI. Most related to our work are data
confinement technologies, which confines untrusted code with
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confidentiality and integrity guarantees. Ryoan [35] and its follow-
up work [34] provide an SFI-based distributed sand-box by port-
ing NaCl to the enclave environment, confining untrusted data-
processing modules to prevent leakage of the userâĂŹs input data.
However the overhead of Ryoan turns out huge (e.g., 100% on
genes data) and was evaluated on an software emulator for sup-
porting SGXv2 instructions. XFI [29] is the most representative
unconventional PCC work based on SFI, which places a verifier
at OS level, instead of a lightweight TEE. Occlum [60] is a design
of SGX-based library OS, enforcing in-enclave task isolation with
MPX-based multi-domain SFI scheme. As the goal of SFI scheme is
not to prevent information leakage from untrusted code, none of
them employs protections against side channel leakages.
Code privacy. Code secrecy is is an easy to be ignored but very
important issue [38, 42]. DynSGX [65] and SGXElide [18] bothmake
possible that developers execute their code privately in public cloud
environments, enabling developers to better manage the scarce
memory resources. However, they only care about the developer’s
privacy but ignore the confidentiality of data belonging to users.
Confidentiality verification of enclave programs. With formal
verification tools, Moat [67] and its follow-up works [66] can ver-
ify if an enclave program has the risk of data leakage. The major
focus of them is to verify the confidentiality of an SGX application
outside the enclave formally and independently. Although it is pos-
sible that the verification could be performed within a “bootstrap
enclave”, the TCB would include the IR level language (BoogiePL)
interpreter [17] and a theorem prover [27]. Moreover, neither of
them can discharge the large overhead introduced by instruction
modeling and assertion proving when large-scale real-world pro-
grams are verified.
Side channel attacks and defenses. Side channels pose serious
threats to secure computing using SGX as attackers can use them to
circumvent explicit security defenses implemented by SGX. A rich
literature has focused on discovering SGX side channels [24, 40,
71, 74] and their defenses [25, 48, 61, 62, 68]. Existing SGX secure
computing work often assumes side channels as an orthogonal
research topic [60, 67, 69]. Our framework is designed with side
channels in mind and we have shown that it can flexibly support
integration of instrumentation based side channel defenses.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed the CAT, a remote attestation model
that allows the user to verify the code and data provided by un-
trusted parties without undermining their privacy and integrity.
Meanwhile, we instantiated the design of a code generator and a
code consumer (the bootstrap enclave) - a lightweight PCC-type
verification framework. Due to the differences between normal
binary and SGX binary, we retrofit the PCC-type framework to be
fitted into SGX. In return, we reduce the framework’s TCB as small
as possible. Our work does not use formal certificate to validate
the loaded private binary, but leverage data/control flow analysis
to fulfill the goal of verifying if a binary has such data leakage,
allowing our solution to scale to real-world software. Moreover,
our method provides a new paradigm for PCC to use a TEE (other
than the OS) as an execution environment, which provides more
powerful protection.
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APPENDIX
.1 Instrumentation Details
Here we illustrate other instrumentation modules in our code gen-
erator.
RSP modification instrumentation. Since RSP spilling would
cause illegal implicit memory writing, RSP modification instruc-
tions should also be checked. This module first locates all RSP
modification instructions in the program and then instruments as-
sembly code after them to check whether the RSP values are out
of bounds. Just like storing instruction instrumentation, the upper
and lower boundaries of RSP are specified by the loader and written
into the assembly instructions by the rewriter, while the compiler
only fills them with speical immediates (5ffffffffffff and 6ffffffffffff).
When the instrumentation finds that the stack pointer is modified
to an illegal address, it will cause the program to exit. Fig. 12 shows
eight instructions be inserted after the ANDQ instruction, which is
tend to reserve new stack spaces (minus 16 from the value in RSP
register). We leave the enforcement of implicit modification of the
stack pointer using PUSH and POP by adding guard pages (a page
with no permission granted) to the dynamic loader.
1 andq $−16 , %r sp
2 pushq %rax
3 movabsq $0x5FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF , %rax
4 cmpq %rax , %r sp
5 j a e x i t _ l a b e l
6 movabsq $0x6FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF , %rax
7 cmpq %rax , %r sp
8 j b e x i t _ l a b e l
9 popq %rax
Figure 12: RSP Modifying Instrumentation
Indirect branch instrumentation. For checking indirect branches,
we first extract all legal target names at assembly level, and output
them to a list. After that, we insert a inspection function calling in
front of every indirect branch instruction (in Fig. 13), to achieve
forward-edge CFI check at runtime. Specifically, the inspection
function CFICheck is written and included in the target binary, to
search if the indirect branch is on that list, therefore ensuring they
conform to the program control flow.
1 movq %reg , % r d i
2 c a l l q CFICheck
Instrumentations before callq %reg
1 movq (% reg ) , % r d i
2 c a l l q CFICheck
Instrumentations before callq (%reg)
Figure 13: Indirect Call Instrumentation
Shadow stack. For function returns, the code generator instru-
ments instructions to support a shadow call stack, which is a
fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges [22]. The
shadow stackâĂŹs base address is specified by the loader, and will
be rewritten by the Imm rewriter (to replace the imm filled in by
the compiler in advance).
As shown in Fig. 14, at every function entry, we insert instruc-
tions (before the function stack alignment) that will modify the
shadow stack top pointer and push the function’s return address
into the shadow stack. Similar to instrumentation at the function
entry, instructions inserted before the function returns modify the
stack pointer and pop the return address. Comparing the saved
return address with the real return address, RET will be checked.
1 movabsq $0x2FFFFFFFFFFF , %r11
2 addq $8 , (% r11 )
3 movq (% r11 ) , %r10
4 addq %r10 , %r11
5 movq (% r sp ) , %r10
6 movq %r10 , (% r11 )
7 pushq %rbp
8 movq %rsp , %rbp
Instrumentation before stack alignment
1 movabsq $0x2FFFFFFFFFFF , %r11
2 movq (% r11 ) , %r10
3 addq %r11 , %r10
4 subq $8 , (% r11 )
5 movq (% r10 ) , %r11
6 cmpq %r11 , (% r sp )
7 j n e e x i t _ l a b e l
Instrumentation before function return
1 e x i t _ l a b e l :
2 movl $0xFFFFFFFF , %ed i
3 c a l l q e x i t
Instrumentation for exit label
Figure 14: Structured Guard Formats of Shadow Stack
SSA monitoring instrumentation. As demonstrated in previous
works [25, 31], AEX can be detected by monitoring the SSA. There-
for, to enforce P6, we instrument every basic block to set a marker
in the SSA and monitor whether the marker is overwritten by AEX
within the basic block. The execution is terminated once the number
of AEXes within the basic block exceeds a preset threshold.
A function is also implemented to get the interrupt context in-
formation in the bootstrap enclave’s SSA area. At the beginning of
each basic block, we call this function through instrumentation to
check whether there are too many interruptions during execution.
When a basic block is too large, this function will also be called in
the middle of basic block every k (k = 20) instructions. We count
the number of interrupts/AEXs that occurred from the last check
to the current check. When 22 or more are triggered, the target
program aborts.
Alternatives. To mitigate AEX based side-channel risks, CAT-SGX
provides an alternative enforcement mechanisms, through TSX,
which can be chosen when compiling the target program. The TSX
approach is based upon T-SGX [61], putting transaction memory
protection on each basic block and running a fall-back function to
keep track of the number of interrupts observed. Just like T-SGX,
when more than 10 consecutive AEXes happen, the computation
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1 movq %rax , %r15
2 l a h f
3 movq %rax , %r14
4 c a l l q t r an s a c t i onEndBeg i n
5 movq %r14 , %rax
6 s ah f
7 movq %r15 , %rax
Figure 15: TSX instrumentation
aborts, due to the concern of an ongoing side-channel attack. The
protection is instrumented by the generator and its presence is
verified by the code consumer in the enclave.
We have implemented a function, in which XBEGIN and XEND is
called and fallback is specified. Around each branch and CALL/RET
instruction and at the begin/end of each basic block, we call this
function so that the program leaves the last transaction and enters
a new transaction when a possible control flow branch occurs and
completes. Some code snippets are shown in Figure 15.
To deal with the compatibility problems caused by calling func-
tions that has no need to be checked (e.g., the system calls via
OCall stubs), we implemented another non-TSX wrapper for exter-
nal functions. For instance, our pass will generate an alternative
function wrapper_foo to replace original function foo, to avoid
the TSX instrumentation.
.2 Preparing Target Binary
Libc. To manage interactions with the untrusted operating system,
we make some Ocall stubs for system calls. Related works [52, 63,
64, 70] provide various great Ocall interfaces. But some of them
still require additional interface sanitizations. We use parts of Musl
Libc [8] for completing the code loading support (Section 4.3). Un-
doubtedly, the Musl Libc also should be instrumented. Then, it can
be linked against other necessary libraries statically, e.g., mbedTLS
for buiding an HTTPS server.
Stack and heap. We also reserved customized stack and heap space
for the target program execution. During the above-mentioned load-
ing phase, the CAT-SGX system will initialize a 4MB size memory
space for the stack, and will link against a customized and instru-
mented malloc function for later heap usage. In current version
of our prototype, the memory ranges of the additional stack and
the heap provided for the target program are fixed, for efficient
boundary checking.
Other necessary functions. The instrumented proof includes not
only the assembly instructions. Some necessary functions and ob-
jects also should be compiled and linked. Since we need an algo-
rithm to check if the address of an indirect branch target is on the
legal entry label list (for P5 enforcement), a binary search function
CFICheck is inserted into the target program. Similarly, as we need
a function to enforce P6, necessary functions need to be called for
SSA monitoring frequently. Those objects would also be disassem-
bled and checked during the stage of proof verification, to ensure
that these can not be compromised when they are called.
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